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Keeping the Internet Neutral?: Tim 
Wu and Christopher Yoo Debate 
Tim Wu is Professor of Law at the Columbia Law School. He is the 
author of Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination (2003) and 
coauthor, with Jack Goldsmith, of Who Controls the Internet? (Oxford 
University Press 2006). Christopher S. Yoo is Professor of Law and 
Director of the Technology and Entertainment Law Program at the 
Vanderbilt University Law School. He is the author of Beyond Network 
Neutrality (2005) and Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion 
(2006) and the coauthor, with Daniel F. Spulber, of the forthcoming 
Networks in Telecommunications: Economics and Law (Cambridge 
University Press).  
 
Yoo: 
During the past year, network neutrality emerged as one of the most 
controversial issues in Internet policy. Although the details of specific 
proposals differ, as a general matter, a network neutrality mandate would 
prohibit network owners from discriminating against particular applications 
and content providers. Network neutrality played a key role in the debates 
over communications reform legislation that was pending before the Senate 
and the House of Representatives, as well as in the Federal 
Communications Commission’s (“FCC”) clearance of the SBC-AT&T, 
Verizon-MCI, and AT&T-BellSouth mergers.
1
 
I am not convinced that deviations from network neutrality will 
necessarily harm consumers and innovation. On the contrary, competition 
and innovation might be better served if policymakers embraced a 
                                                           
        1. On the role that network neutrality played in congressional debates and the SBC-
AT&T and Verizon-MCI mergers, see Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the 
Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847, 1859–60 (2006) [hereinafter Economics of 
Congestion]. On the AT&T-BellSouth merger, see AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corporation 
Application for Transfer of Control, News Release, WC Docket No. 06-74 (Dec. 29, 2006) 
(merger conditions available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
269275A1.pdf). 
576 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59 
“network diversity” principle that would allow different network owners to 
pursue different approaches to routing traffic. 
Simply put, deviations from network neutrality may represent nothing 
more than network owners’ attempts to satisfy the increasingly intense and 
heterogeneous demands imposed by end-users.
2
 The early Internet was 
dominated by applications such as email and Web browsing, in which 
delays of half a second were virtually unnoticeable. These are being 
replaced by newer applications, such as Internet telephony and streaming 
video, in which such delays can be catastrophic. One obvious solution 
would be to give a higher priority to traffic associated with time-sensitive 
applications. Unfortunately, this is precisely the type of discrimination 
between applications that network neutrality would condemn.
3
 
Another interesting innovation is the emergence of content-delivery 
networks like Akamai, which reportedly serves 15% of the world’s Web 
traffic. Suppose that an end-user in Los Angeles attempted to download a 
Web page from CNN.com. If CNN.com hosted the content itself, this 
request would have to travel thousands of miles to the server in CNN’s 
headquarters in Atlanta and back, passing any number of points of 
congestion along the way. The speed with which the request is filled also 
depends on the number of other queries being directed at CNN’s server. 
Akamai minimizes delay by caching content at thousands of locations 
throughout the Internet and routing requests to the server that is the closest 
and/or the least congested. The catch from the standpoint of network 
neutrality is that Akamai is a commercial enterprise, which means that 
those who are willing to pay more get faster service.
4
 
Employing different protocols might also provide more competition 
among network platforms by permitting multiple networks to survive by 
targeting subsegments of the overall market, in much the same way that 
specialty stores survive in a world dominated by low-cost, mass-market 
retailers (or, more properly, given the scale necessary for a 
telecommunications network to be viable, in the same way that department 
stores compete by developing strengths in certain types of merchandise and 
becoming the exclusive distribution outlet for particular product lines). For 
example, deviating from network neutrality might make it possible for 
three last-mile networks to coexist: one optimized for traditional Internet 
applications, such as email and Web site access; a second incorporating 
                                                           
        2. See Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Network Neutrality Help or Hurt 
Broadband Competition?: A Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & 
HIGH TECH. L. 23, 34–37 (2004). 
        3. Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 20–25 
(2005) [hereinafter Beyond Network Neutrality]. 
        4. See Economics of Congestion, supra note 1, at 1881–82. 
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security features to facilitate e-commerce; and a third that facilitates time-
sensitive applications such as streaming media and Internet telephony. 
Network neutrality, in contrast, threatens to foreclose this outcome and 
instead forces networks to compete solely on price and network size—
considerations that favor the largest players.
5
 
At this point, it is impossible to foresee which architecture will 
ultimately represent the best approach. When it is impossible to tell 
whether a practice would promote or hinder competition, the accepted 
policy response is to permit the practice to go forward until actual harm to 
consumers can be proven. This restraint provides the room for 
experimentation upon which normal competitive processes depend. It also 
shows appropriate humility about our ability to predict the technological 
future.
6
 
 
Wu: 
Network neutrality is a useful way of talking about discrimination 
policies, on networks or otherwise. Whether it comes to employment, 
networks, or just about anything else, no one really believes in systems that 
ban discrimination completely. In employment, for example, you want to 
be able to fire people who are lousy—to discriminate on the basis of 
ability. When government chooses who gets to vote, we accept that it can 
say “no” to twelve-year-olds. 
Yet I don’t think that the fact that an absolute ban on discrimination 
would be ridiculous undermines the case for discrimination laws. It’s like 
what nutritionists say about fat: there are good and bad types. And what I 
think is going on in the network neutrality debate—the useful part of it—is 
getting a better grip on what amounts to good and bad forms of 
discrimination on information networks. 
Christopher, you’ve done a good job of suggesting some of the 
reasons that types of discrimination can be useful on a network, like 
dealing with congestion problems and offering different types of networks 
altogether. These are valid points. But sometimes you seem to be arguing 
that based on a few good examples of discrimination, that there’s no such 
thing as bad discrimination—particularly where a network gatekeeper has 
market power. That is where we part company. 
I’ll start with the clearest network example: blocking. So yes, in 
general, a Bell or cable company has some interest in giving you as broadly 
useful a network as possible, because then the product is more valuable, 
and the company can charge more for it. But that interest in neutrality holds 
                                                           
        5. See Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 3, at 27–37. 
        6. See id. at  6–7, 75.  
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true only to a point. If a product being offered over the network—say, 
Internet voice (“VoIP”) for $5 a month—competes with an established 
revenue source (telephone service, offered at $30 a month), the temptation 
to block it is strong. It is true that, in theory, the provider might start 
charging the customer $25 a month extra because the network is now more 
valuable. But that means taking on the costs of changing business models 
and establishing new consumer pricing patterns, which companies are loath 
to do. 
I am not sure if you would go so far to suggest that blocking is fine 
because either companies won’t do it or will have good reasons when they 
do. As to whether they will, we don’t have to make guesses, because 
incumbent providers in the United States and in many countries around the 
world, including Mexico, have blocked or wanted to block competition 
from VoIP. The United States Trade Representative’s office has an ongoing 
practice, in fact, of trying to talk to countries and their incumbents about 
such blocking. They don’t call it network neutrality or anything of the sort, 
but it is the export of network neutrality policies. 
What’s bad about blocking, then? At an extreme, blocking can keep a 
better or cheaper product (VoIP) from coming to market at all, and often it 
can prevent such products from being offered in an effective form. That’s a 
problem, in turn, because if you believe that market entry and innovation 
are linked to economic growth, we’re ultimately talking about such policies 
hindering the growth rate of the country. 
Now I admit blocking is the clearest case where discrimination is bad, 
and it provides the strongest justification for network neutrality rules. 
That’s what Michael Powell thought too, and that’s why he announced 
such blocking would be illegal.
7
 But I also think there’s another type of bad 
discrimination—picking favorites, or choosing one company out of many 
to favor. I’ll explain why in the next post, but I better let you back on to see 
what you have to say. 
 
Yoo: 
To date, the debate has focused primarily on a type of discrimination 
known as “access tiering,” in which network owners charge Web sites and 
application providers more for premium (i.e., higher speed) service. Access 
tiering could provide benefits similar to those provided by the emergence 
of premium mail services like FedEx. Instead of taking three to four days to 
send a letter from coast to coast, FedEx made it possible to send the same 
letter overnight. FedEx customers were more than happy to pay more for 
                                                           
        7. Ben Charny, Mexico Telephone Operator Under VoIP Fire, CNETNEWS.COM, Apr. 
25, 2005 (describing USTR comments), available at http://news.com.com/Mexico+telephon 
e+operator+under+VoIP+fire/2100-7352_3-5681542.html. 
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faster service, since it opened up new ways of doing business that were 
impossible when everyone paid the same amount for a single class of 
service. 
The same logic applies to the Internet. The Internet is currently 
dominated by a suite of protocols known as TCP/IP (Transmission Control 
Protocol/Internet Protocol). TCP/IP has two notable features: first, it routes 
traffic on a “first come, first served” basis, which provides no guarantees as 
to how quickly a packet will arrive; second, it also routes traffic on a “best 
efforts” basis, which provides no guarantees that a packet will ever be 
delivered. Companies developing applications that depend on guaranteed 
throughput rates (e.g., 100 Mbps) have indicated that they would willingly 
pay more to ensure better quality service. This has led leading technologists 
to point out that TCP/IP is a thirty-year-old technology and that network 
owners should be permitted to experiment with new capabilities.
8
  
So what is the proper policy response if access tiering would 
sometimes be beneficial and sometimes not? Fortunately, the Supreme 
Court’s antitrust jurisprudence offers useful guidance. These precedents 
establish a presumption in favor of the rule of reason, which evaluates 
competitive harms on a case-by-case basis.
9
 Practices that evince such a 
“pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue” that 
they can be “conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore 
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or 
the business excuse for their use” are declared to be illegal per se and are 
categorically prohibited.
10
 Conversely, there is a strong argument in favor 
of treating practices that are almost never harmful as legal per se.
11
 In the 
absence of a “demonstrable economic effect,” practices should not be 
categorically prohibited.
12
 Practices that are sometimes harmful and 
sometimes beneficial are subject to the rule of reason, which permits them 
to go forward until those challenging them can demonstrate a concrete 
harm to competition.
13
 Supreme Court precedent would thus contradict 
regulations that would make ambiguous practices like access tiering 
                                                           
        8. See Andrew Orlowski, Father of Internet Warns Against Net Neutrality, THE 
REGISTER, Jan. 18, 2007, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/01/18/ kahn_net_ neutrality_ 
warning/ (quoting speech by co-developer of TCP/IP Robert Kahn and noting that with the 
exception of Vint Cerf, who now serves as a policy advocate for Google, “most of the senior 
engineers responsible for developing the packet switched internetworking of today oppose 
‘Neutrality’ legislation.”). 
        9. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726 (1988). 
      10. See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1957). 
      11. See Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted 
Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 23–26 (1981). 
      12. Bus. Elecs., 485 U.S. at 726. 
      13. Id. 
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categorically illegal. Instead, it would seem to favor taking a middle 
course—like my “network diversity” proposal—that would allow networks 
to experiment with different approaches unless and until they are shown to 
harm competition.
14
 
Even Web site or port blocking may not be as problematic as may 
appear at first glance. One of the central insights of competition policy is 
that network owners have powerful incentives to maximize the value of 
applications and content delivered through their networks.
15
 As suggested 
in my earlier post, exclusivity can provide a form of differentiation that can 
increase the number of providers who can survive. For example, DirecTV’s 
exclusive access to the “NFL Sunday Ticket” package has enhanced its 
ability to compete with cable,
16
 and DirecTV recently struck a similar deal 
for Major League Baseball’s “Extra Innings” package. The partnership 
between Yahoo! and SBC’s (now AT&T’s) DSL service and Disney’s and 
ESPN’s recent efforts to offer mobile phones that give preferential access 
to certain types of content may represent attempts to pursue a similar 
strategy.
17
 And if a wireless broadband or broadband over powerline 
(“BPL”) provider were to emerge so that consumers have at least three last-
mile broadband options (including cable modem and DSL), there would be 
little danger in allowing one of those networks to experiment with 
exclusivity arrangements. The experimenting network might find a new 
business model that would deliver greater value to consumers. If not, then 
we would expect competitors to steal business from the experimenting 
network until it reversed course.  
In any event, the possibility of anticompetitive blocking would not 
                                                           
      14. See Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 3, at 75. Interestingly, the speech in 
which Michael Powell announced his four Internet freedoms is often misconstrued as an 
endorsement of network neutrality regulation. See Michael K. Powell, Preserving Internet 
Freedom: Guiding Principles for the Industry, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 5, 11–
12 (2004). Powell made clear at the time that he thought that the evidence did not justify 
mandating network neutrality and that his words were offered simply as a statement of a set 
of best practices to which he thought the industry should adhere. Id. at 10. Powell has 
subsequently reemphasized the same point. See Economics of Congestion, supra note 1, at 
1857.  
      15. See Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New 
Economy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 187–202, 253–67 (2002) [hereinafter Vertical 
Integration]; accord Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, 
and Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the 
Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 104 (2003) (noting that “the platform monopolist 
has an incentive to be a good steward of the applications sector for its platform”); James B. 
Speta, Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile?:  A Critique of Open Access Rules for 
Broadband Platforms, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 39, 76 (2000) (noting that network owners have 
strong incentives to maximize the value of complementary services). 
      16. See Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 3, at 32. 
      17. See Economics of Congestion, supra note 1, at 1895. 
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support the type of general nondiscrimination mandate favored by network 
neutrality proponents. The only time that network owners have a plausible 
incentive to block a Web site is when they sponsor Web sites that compete 
directly with the blocked site. Conversely, network owners that do not 
operate auction sites have no incentive to block eBay, since doing so would 
simply lower the value of their network (and thus lower the amount that 
they can charge for it) without providing any compensating benefits. 
Similarly, while DSL providers may have some incentive to block VoIP, 
they have no plausible incentive to block services like streaming video that 
they do not currently offer. At most, concerns about blocking would thus 
support limited regulatory intervention that would only prohibit vertically 
integrated network owners from blocking content and applications that 
competed directly with their own offerings. It would not justify broad 
restrictions on discrimination of the kind being proposed (and currently 
being rejected) in Congress.
18
  
 
Wu: 
A lot of the difference between Christopher’s view and my own stems 
from how we think the process of innovation occurs. Christopher, rather 
like Joseph Schumpeter in his later years, believes that large firms—in this 
case, network operators—drive telecommunications innovation. As 
Schumpeter then put it, the ‘‘large-scale establishment’’ is ‘‘the most 
powerful engine of progress and in particular of the long-run expansion of 
total output.’’
19
  
Christopher thinks incumbents like AT&T will rarely or perhaps 
never threaten innovation. Instead he views them as the driving force of the 
technologies of tomorrow. 
I am skeptical. I think this view of incumbent behavior has been 
discredited, and that in general, incumbents, particularly in a monopoly 
position, have a strong incentive to block market entry and innovative 
technologies that threaten their existing business model. 
My faith is that economic growth is driven by market entry, and I 
believe that when it’s careful, government can play an important role in 
controlling barriers to market entry that incumbents might impose. That’s 
not to say it is easy—the challenge is to bar the worst abuses without 
destroying an incentive to become an incumbent in the first place. 
Government often gets it wrong. But Christopher’s views tend toward 
assuming the problem away, through what I view as unrealistic 
assumptions about incumbent behavior. 
                                                           
      18. See id. at 1899–900. 
      19. See JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM & DEMOCRACY 106 (1957). 
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The growth of the many industries on top of the Internet is a powerful 
testament to the vision I’ve described. For the Internet’s design itself, and 
then successive FCC rules (like the famous Computer Inquiries rules) 
managed to prevent infrastructure incumbents from having any influence 
on market entry. My stake, stated otherwise, is with the younger 
Schumpeter, who studied entrepreneurs, unusual individuals with ‘‘the 
dream or will to found a private kingdom,’’ ‘‘the will to conquer: the 
impulse to fight, to prove oneself superior to others,’’ and finally the ‘‘joy 
of creating.’’
20
 
But let’s turn away from theory to the practical matter Christopher 
brought up: what he calls access tiering—or giving preferential treatment 
over the last mile. 
In my view, there are several problematic sides to access tiering. You 
have, say, AT&T with a monopoly over broadband in a given area. AT&T 
makes an exclusive deal with Yahoo! to provide preferred searches on 
AT&T’s network. As a consequence, the Yahoo! engine loads faster than 
any of its competitors. I’ve said elsewhere it might be as if your electric 
company was to make a deal with Samsung so that your refrigerators from 
General Electric would no longer work quite so well. That’s the problem 
I’m discussing. 
There’s a word for this: it’s a form of discrimination called Most 
Favored Nation (“MFN”) discrimination—different treatment of like, 
competing products. And the problem, of course, is a distortion of 
competition. In our search example, the best product doesn’t win, but rather 
the product with the best connection to AT&T, and the one that poses no 
threat to any of AT&T’s business models. 
Second, access tiering is another word for charging companies a 
termination fee—a fee to reach customers of the service provider in 
question. While Christopher and others suggest that access tiering will lead 
to more innovation in the last mile, the opposite can be true. If you can 
generate revenue by charging content provider to reach customers, as 
opposed to charging for bandwidth, something happens. The incentives 
become mixed, as the provider gains an incentive to maintain a level of 
scarcity, and thereby maximize gatekeeper revenue. So I don’t agree with 
Christopher that access fees will necessarily spark more last-mile 
innovation. 
All this returns me to the earlier discussion of innovation. The risk, as 
I’ve said elsewhere, is a market where several large companies set the pace 
of innovation, not the challenges of competitors. But historically—and by 
current economic theory—the many beat out the few. I’ll take the track 
                                                           
      20. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, A THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 93 (Harvard Univ. 
1961).  
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record of decentralized innovation. 
 
Yoo: 
The Schumpeterian thesis (that large firms are more innovative) has 
spawned a huge empirical literature that is largely inconclusive.
21
 AT&T 
provides an excellent example. On the one hand, the Bell System created a 
telephone network that was the envy of the world and pioneered Nobel 
Prize-winning breakthroughs such as the transistor. On the other hand, it 
was extremely slow to deploy innovative technologies like DSL. 
Furthermore, Schumpeterian competition is founded on the idea that 
horizontal competition within a market among similarly situated players 
offering similar products to the same customers would be replaced by 
competition between a succession of monopolists for the market. 
Interestingly, network diversity would provide a way for multiple players 
to survive and prevent the market from collapsing into Schumpeterian 
competition in the first place.
22
 
But the Schumpeterian thesis is not central to the debate over network 
neutrality. As Tim has recognized in his earlier work, network neutrality is 
really about vertical integration between content and conduit.
23
 Over the 
past few decades, vertical integration theory has undergone a sea change.
24 
Until the 1970s, economic theory and the Supreme Court’s antitrust 
jurisprudence were quite hostile toward vertical integration. Instead, they 
fostered a world in which manufacturers were free to mix and match with 
different retailers and distributors as they saw fit. 
Over time, both academia and the courts began to realize that vertical 
integration simply represents a different way to organize an industry that 
can often yield substantial benefits. To cite one concrete example, the 
central goal of the breakup of AT&T was to enable consumers to choose 
their long-distance provider.
25
 In today’s world, wireless customers cannot 
choose their long-distance provider, and yet that fact has not prevented the 
wireless market from being extremely competitive. The key difference is 
that during the breakup of AT&T, there was only one local service option. 
In today’s world, there are more, and the competition among them keeps 
everyone honest. 
Competition policy thus teaches us that any vertical chain of 
                                                           
      21. See Vertical Integration, supra note 15, at 276–77. 
      22. See Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 3, at 58–60. 
      23. See Tim Wu, The Broadband Debate, A User’s Guide, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 69, 84–85 (2004).  
      24. See Economics of Congestion, supra note 1, at 1885–87; Vertical Integration, supra 
note 155, at 186–202. 
      25. See Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 3, at 17–18.  
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production will only be as efficient as its least competitive link. The proper 
focus of broadband policy is to identify the level of production that is the 
most concentrated and the most protected by entry barriers and to try to 
make it more competitive. This suggests that the current debate is focusing 
on the wrong policy problem. Network neutrality proposals are aimed at 
preserving competition in applications and content, which are those 
portions of the industry that are already the most competitive and the least 
protected by entry barriers (and thus the most likely to remain that way). 
Instead, the real focus should be on the impact network neutrality 
regulation would have on the competitiveness of the last-mile.
26
 
The last twelve months demonstrate how imposing network neutrality 
threatens to reduce investment in new last-mile technologies. After the 
Supreme Court’s June 2005 Brand X decision made clear that content and 
applications providers could no longer count on regulation to guarantee 
access to cable modem and DSL systems,
27
 companies such as Google, 
Microsoft, Earthlink, and Intel began pouring money into wireless 
broadband and broadband over powerline (“BPL”), demonstrated most 
dramatically by Google’s agreement to build a wireless broadband network 
in San Francisco for free.
28
 These were not acts of corporate charity. The 
threat of being cut off from the existing networks was what spurred these 
companies into investing in new ones. 
I also do not think that Most Favored Nation nondiscrimination will 
be as easy to implement as Tim suggests. The Supreme Court’s Trinko 
decision recognized that the complexity of the interface between 
telecommunications providers creates myriad nonprice-related dimensions 
along which the quality of interconnection can vary.
29
 Mandating 
nondiscrimination would thus require policing a large swath of the business 
relationship between a party seeking access and a network that would not 
be doing business with it absent regulation. Furthermore, large, established 
players have more resources and experience with which to influence the 
regulatory process.
30
 
Competition in the last mile can achieve the same benefits while 
avoiding the problems associated with regulation. Once a sufficient number 
of last-mile options exists, it would matter little if one network chose to 
make Yahoo! its preferred search engine. As I noted earlier, exclusivity can 
                                                           
      26. See Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 3, at 15–18. 
      27. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
      28. See Economics of Congestion, supra note 1, 1894–95. 
      29. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 
414–15 (2004). 
      30. See Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 3, at 37–45, 67–68; Economics of 
Congestion, supra note 1, at 1896–97. 
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promote competition by allowing networks to compete on dimensions aside 
from price and network size (considerations that inherently favor the 
largest players). If such exclusivity proves to be uneconomic, the network 
will lose customers until it returns to nonexclusivity. 
So I agree with Tim that we should place our faith in market entry. 
Where we differ is that I would focus on entry into the last mile, not entry 
into content and applications. And economic theory and Supreme Court 
precedent have both recognized that mandating access would increase last-
mile concentration by reducing incentives to invest in new transmission 
technologies.
31
  
 
Wu: 
Christopher brings up the economics of the last mile, which are worth 
talking about, and to my mind, unendingly interesting. They are a shortcut 
for talking about the economics of infrastructure, which is really the center 
of this debate. 
So the classic challenge with infrastructure projects like the last mile 
is this: there are high upfront costs to build the infrastructure, and low 
“marginal” or incremental costs of running the infrastructure. If we’re 
talking about roads, for example, it costs a lot to build a road, but the cost 
of handling each additional car on the road is low (nearly nothing). 
Those economics have a tendency to make market entry challenging. 
That’s why some (though this is disputed) suggest that infrastructure like 
plumbing, electricity, or telecom service is by its nature a “natural 
monopoly.”  
Whether that is true is a big debate that I don’t want to get into. It is 
worth saying that the label “natural monopoly” has sometimes been used to 
justify too much regulation. But let’s look at the telecom situation. 
In telecom, the high upfront costs have sometimes but not always 
scared off private investments. They haven’t scared off investment when 
the market entrant is offering a new and compelling service, like cable 
television in the 1970s, or at one point, telephone service between the 
1890s and the 1920s. But when there’s an incumbent in place, either its 
presence, or misguided regulation like franchising requirements, seems to 
have deterred market entry. 
Internet access is a good example. There is vigorous market entry, as 
Christopher noted, at virtually every part of the Internet-affiliated 
economy—including, at the infrastructure layer, the national backbone. But 
the exception to this rule is the last mile. Today, despite much hope and 
                                                           
      31. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407–08, 414; Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 3, at 
48–53.  
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talk over the last decade, there hasn’t been a successful widespread 
deployment of a third pipe to the home (including wireless). Sprint, for a 
while, offered a fixed wireless service. Some areas, usually rural, use 
satellite services. Broadband over powerlines is still talked about now and 
then, but truly mass deployments, according to the FCC’s numbers, do not 
exist.
32
  
The basic story, for most of the country’s businesses, is a monopoly, 
and for homes, a duopoly of cable and Bell.    
So if we want to encourage the deployment of last-mile infrastructure, 
what to do? There are a number of classic solutions to the infrastructure 
problem, and I’ll discuss three. 
1. One is for government to spend money and build the infrastructure 
itself. That’s what the United States does for roads, and what many Asian 
countries have been doing with the Internet and broadband. Their theory is 
that the purpose of government is to invest in national infrastructure, and 
they see investing in Internet infrastructure as a part of that. 
In fact, I remember meeting with a Chinese Internet policy advisor to 
President Hu Jintao, and he asked me how much the U.S. federal 
government spends on building networks. I said, other than some funding 
for schools, and investments in research, very little. Astounded, he asked, 
“But what about the Internet?” That was research, I said. 
Today’s municipal broadband networks are an example of a local 
version of the same policy. They are efforts by the government to build 
infrastructure it doesn’t think will be built by the private sector. 
I don’t want to say there aren’t problems with these kinds of 
approaches. Pork projects are a predictable consequence—railways to 
nowhere, and so on. There are also good odds that the wrong thing will be 
built—roads when we need railways, or vice versa. But anyhow, it’s one 
approach, and one this country and others have used frequently over 
history. 
2. A similar solution is to subsidize buildouts, one way or another.  
We can find this in another major part of U.S. infrastructure policy: the 
mortgage deduction. The result of the mortgage deduction is that 
developers build far more homes and buildings than they would otherwise. 
It is a straightforward incentive to build. Such incentives might be 
considered for broadband. 
In telecom policy, telephone companies already take major 
depreciation deductions, but it might be possible for the tax code to do 
more to encourage deployments of information networks. There are, of 
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course, problems with this approach too, like getting the tax deduction 
wrong in one of a million ways. 
3. Do nothing. Doing nothing isn’t a bad approach, necessarily. It 
presumes that in some way or another, either the market or new 
technologies will overcome the infrastructure economics problem. It is true, 
for example, that the lure of offering TV service and capturing some of 
cable’s market share seems to be what is pulling Verizon and AT&T into 
deploying fiber optic cable in some areas. Doing nothing is also a bet that 
new technologies might arrive (or have arrived) that overcome the 
problems of last-mile economics—such as the hope that eventually wireless 
technologies of some kind will solve the last-mile solution. If you don’t 
think broadband infrastructure is not worth subsidizing, and if what you 
fear most is the risk of government wasting too much money on 
infrastructure, doing nothing is has its merits. 
The downside with doing nothing is the possibility that nothing will 
happen. It is possible that, under a do-nothing approach, today’s duopoly 
will simply persist, and build out higher speed networks with all deliberate 
speed, which is to say, slowly. Stated differently, Christopher may be 
wrong about how much technological developments have really changed 
the economics of the last mile. From my time in industry, I’m frankly a 
little skeptical of the view that today’s last-mile is truly a contestable 
market, but I’d love to be proved wrong.  
All of these options have their attractions and problems. But to my 
mind, given the fundamental nature of the problem, the issue of network 
neutrality is really quite beside the point. The problems of infrastructure 
economics are real and cannot be ignored. But the connection between 
these points and allowing last-mile providers to run discriminatory 
networks seems to me tangential at best. 
Arguably, as a “solution” to the last-mile problem, allowing 
discrimination is both costly and ineffective. Its costs are large potential 
costs to the application market. And the idea that it will somehow solve the 
economic problems of the last mile strikes me as unlikely at best. So you 
risk the health of the applications market, and really, all for what? 
 
Yoo: 
I agree that the high fixed costs have long represented one of the 
defining features of the telecommunications industry and the touchstone of 
all telecommunications policy. For decades, the conventional wisdom 
accepted that local telecommunications networks were natural monopolies 
and that competition among multiple last-mile networks was infeasible. 
Thus, even though concentration in the last mile represented the central 
issue in telecommunications policy, it was presumed that any attempt to 
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increase the competitiveness of the last mile would ultimately prove futile. 
As a result, policymakers focused on the second-best goal of promoting 
competition in complementary services.
33
 It was during this period that the 
FCC instituted the prior access regulations that Tim usually invokes as 
precedents for network neutrality.
34
  
The economics of the last mile have changed radically in recent years. 
The fixed costs of establishing last-mile networks have dropped through 
the floor. Switching equipment that used to take up an entire building can 
now be housed in a box roughly the size of a personal computer. Copper 
wires have been replaced by a series of innovations, including terrestrial 
microwave, satellites, and fiber optics, which have greatly reduced the 
costs of transmission. 
The emergence of spectrum-based transmission is important for 
another reason. It renders telecommunications markets “contestable.” 
Contestability theory has pointed out that high fixed costs need not 
represent an entry barrier if new entrants can recoup most of those costs by 
reselling them to someone else should they have to exit. Although the 
resale market for the wires of a failed telecommunications network has 
historically been rather limited, the same is not true for spectrum. The 
greater number of ways that spectrum can be used renders the market for 
redeploying spectrum considerably more vibrant.
35
 
Demand-side forces are also rendering competition in the last mile 
increasingly feasible. Many markets involve fixed costs; it is only when the 
fixed costs are large relative to the market as a whole that they become 
problematic. The pressure toward natural monopoly can thus also be 
alleviated by increases in demand as well as by reductions in fixed cost. Put 
a different way, if a network generates more value per customer, the size of 
the customer base that a network owner needs to survive shrinks, and the 
number of networks that can exist in equilibrium increases. 
The development of the Internet has greatly increased the value of the 
services that can be provided by last-mile networks. The rollout of 
convergent technologies, such as Internet telephony and packet video, will 
break down the barriers that previously limited the revenues generated by 
any particular transmission technology. Cable is already able to provide 
voice through its coaxial network, and it is just a matter of time before 
telephone companies are able to provide video. Application-based 
distinctions between transmission media will completely collapse once all 
applications become packetized. At that point, all applications will simply 
be packets riding on a data pipe, and the functional distinctions between 
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transmission media that have long lain at the heart of telecommunications 
policy will become irrelevant.
36
 
Now that competition in the last mile is feasible, the focus should 
shift away from the second-best policy goal of promoting competition in 
complementary services and return to the first-best policy goal of 
promoting competition in the last mile. As I have noted before, this shift in 
focus arguably favors abandoning access regulations like network 
neutrality. Not only are access regulations extremely difficult to implement, 
they can deter investment in new last-mile networks, since content and 
applications providers who are guaranteed access to the existing network 
have no incentive to invest in new ones.
37
 In other words, access regulation 
threatens to deprive would-be builders of alternative network capacity of 
their natural strategic partners. In the process, access regulation could well 
have the perverse effect of cementing the existing last-mile oligopoly into 
place. 
Although government construction of last-mile networks is a 
plausible alternative, global history counsels against such a course. The 
U.S. is singular in its embrace of private ownership of the core 
telecommunications network. In the vast majority of other countries, 
telecommunications networks were government-created and -owned. The 
poor service quality, long waiting lists for installation, and slow 
deployment of new technologies in Britain and other government-owned 
telecommunications systems are legendary. The most eloquent proof is that 
essentially all of those countries are either in the process of privatizing their 
telecommunications networks or have already done so. Waiting for these 
new last-mile networks to emerge can be frustrating, and the lack of last-
mile options may cause content and applications providers difficulty in the 
meantime. Before jumping in and regulating, policymakers should remind 
themselves of the inherent tendency to overvalue immediate harms and to 
undervalue future benefits, because the former seem so concrete and the 
latter so contingent. The problem is that in many (if not most) cases, 
compounding causes the long-term benefits to dominate the short-term 
losses. Placing too great an emphasis on the pressing needs of the here and 
now could foreclose these larger, longer-term benefits from ever being 
realized.
38
 
At the end of the day, a large part of the network neutrality debate can 
be viewed as nothing more than an intramural fight between the large 
content providers (like Google) and the large network providers (like 
Verizon and Comcast). The market power that last-mile providers possess 
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vis-à-vis consumers exists because most Americans currently only have 
two choices in last-mile broadband providers. Mandating network 
neutrality would not alter that fact one iota. As a result, it would not reduce 
the prices that cable modem and DSL charge consumers. That said, 
network neutrality would affect the way that the resulting profits would be 
divided between the Googles and the Verizons of the world. Although the 
division of profits between network providers is crucial to those companies 
and their shareholders, it is not ultimately a policy issue. 
 
Wu: 
Christopher’s last post does a good job of crystallizing the differences 
between us on the last mile. In closing, let’s look at where we differ. 
Christopher believes that, at least when it comes to information 
networks, technology is changing the conditions for market entry in 
physical networking. He points to fiber optics and the potential use of 
wireless spectrum as examples. He believes that over the next decade we’re 
likely to see vigorous competition among new entrants and old, like in any 
other “regular” market. 
At the risk of sounding like a dinosaur, I am skeptical. Despite the 
mists and magic of the Internet, I don’t think the basic economics of 
transportation infrastructure, and particularly telecom’s last mile, have 
changed all that much. The time I actually spent in the industry made me 
very skeptical of the kinds of claims about the technology Christopher has 
made. And if I were investing in the market, I’d be willing to bet 
Christopher that over the next decade the infrastructure market will 
continue to heavily favor the main incumbents. 
Instead of just speaking in the abstract, let’s look at a real example: 
Verizon’s FiOS buildout. According to various figures, the costs are about 
$1500 per home to lay fiber and then hook up a connection.
39
 That’s a lot 
to have a chance of acquiring a customer who then may pay $50–$100 per 
month in services. Those are also the costs of an incumbent carrier who 
already has much of the infrastructure in place, not a true entrant. So if 
you’re a competitive carrier, and say you have plans to reach 10 million 
homes, we’re talking about a $10.5 billion capital investment—in other 
words, serious money. 
These facts are why, despite nearly a decade of talk, there are today 
very few (in most markets, no) “facilities-based” competitors in the 
residential market (other than the basic cable-Bell combination). Those that 
haven’t gone out of business, companies like Yipes, target businesses 
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exclusively. The advantages of incumbency are great indeed. 
In Verizon’s area, FiOS looks to be a great service at a great price 
point, and I wouldn’t be surprised if it serves as a model for successful Bell 
deployments. Meanwhile, cable has few tricks left for getting more 
bandwidth out of its coaxial deployments, through adjusting how it uses the 
bandwidth it already has. 
What I am painting is essentially a rosy picture for the incumbents—
and why not? Comcast and other cable companies have grown strongly 
through the 2000s, prompting Comcast’s CEO to say “2006 was simply our 
best year ever… we could not be more enthusiastic about the future.”
40
  
AT&T, despite weaker facilities, remains healthy and profitable, even 
before merging with Bell South.
41
 I don’t for a second begrudge the Bells 
and cable companies their revenue and profits—I think they demonstrate 
that the Internet economy has lifted all boats. I am in favor of doing 
everything possible to make it easy for the Bells to offer TV service, and 
for the cable companies to offer voice. Giving the Bells and cable more 
ways to compete using private networks encourages the network buildouts 
we’re reading about. 
If I am right about where things are going, I think it leaves two last 
policy questions. First, we ought to ask whether the buildouts we’ll see will 
be fast or extensive enough. At some point, this is an issue of national 
economic policy—what kind of broadband infrastructure does this country 
really want? 
Nothing in the current deployment plans are likely to make “ultra” 
wideband reach marginal customers or nonwealthy areas. So as in other 
areas of infrastructure policy, at some point we’re going to have to decide 
whether we care if the nation’s ultra-broadband networks don’t reach the 
whole population. 
Second, and finally, we should consider what this means for network 
neutrality. I think Christopher is right that in the big picture of last-mile 
economics, net neutrality is chump change. But as I’ve said, net neutrality’s 
prohibitions on discrimination are most important for favoring the lowest-
end market entrants—application companies. That’s why it’s been a wise 
network design and why it makes for wise national policy. 
In the end, network neutrality rules are not the only way government 
can try to lower the costs of market entry in the national economy. 
However, it is one of the simplest, and it has proven very effective over the 
last decade. That’s why I favor whatever it takes—whether it’s just a code 
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of honor or an actual law—that keeps the network as neutral as possible as 
between market competitors, and tries to keep the price of market entry as 
low as possible. 
 
